MANUAL
ON
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
PNPM-DS-0-2-96

VOLUME I

Republic of the Philippines
National Headquarters, Philippine National Police
Directorate for Human Resource and Doctrine Development
Camp Crame, Quezon City 111
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## CHAPTER 1, CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT

### Section I. GENERAL
1-1. The Situation  
1-2. Purpose and Scope  
1-3. Crisis and Emergency  
1-4. Types of Crisis/Emergency  
  a. Man-Made Crises/Emergencies  
  b. Natural Crises/Emergencies  
1-5. General Tasking

### Section II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
1-6. The 4P Crisis Management Model  
1-7. Phases of Crisis Management  
  a. Proactive Phase  
    (1) Prediction  
    (2) Prevention  
    (3) Prepare  
  b. Reactive Phase  
    (1) Initial Action  
    (2) Action  
    (3) Post Action

## CHAPTER 2. CRISIS MANAGEMENT POLICIES

### Section I. NATIONAL POLICY
2-1. Subscription to Anti-Terrorism Covenants  
2-2. Coordinated and Calculated Response Against Anti-Terrorism
2-3. Terrorism Considered a Criminal Act 2-1
2-4. Lawful Means and Peaceful Resolution To Conflict 2-1
2-5. Crisis Situations Involving Foreign Nationals 2-1
2-6. Involvement of Filipino Nationals in Crisis Incidents Abroad 2-2

Section II. DND-AFP/DILG-PNP POLICY

2-7. General 2-2
2-8. Graduated Armed Response 2-2
2-9. Non-Compromise With Terrorists 2-2
2-10. Handling Hostage Situations 2-2
2-11. Respect for Human Rights 2-3
2-12. Development of Nationwide Capability To Cope with Crisis 2-3
2-13. Handling of Crisis at Lowest Level Possible 2-3
2-14. Organization of AFP/PNP Crisis Management
   Reaction Units 2-3
2-15. Development of AFP/PNP Anti-Terrorism Doctrines 2-3
2-16. Guidelines in Addressing Crisis Situation Arising from Threats to National Security Pursuant to E.O. No. 216, s-1995 2-4

CHAPTER 3. CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

Section I. PRO ACTIVE PHASE

3-1. Predict 3-1
   a. Intelligence 3-2
   (1) Strategic Intelligence 3-2
   (2) Tactical Intelligence 3-2
   (3) Operational Intelligence 3-3
   b. Events 3-4
   c. Threat Analysis 3-4
d. Threat Groups 3-4
(1) Broad Categories of Threat Groups 3-4
(2) Terrorists Characteristics 3-5
(3) Threat Characteristics Matrix 3-6
(4) Terrorists Goals 3-11
(5) Terrorists Groups 3-12
(6) Terrorists Operations 3-13
(7) Terrorists Tactics 3-14
(8) Terrorists Targets 3-16
e. Vulnerabilities 3-18
(1) Static Dimensions 3-18
(2) Dynamic Dimensions (Controllable) 3-18
(3) Dynamic Dimensions (Uncontrollable) 3-18
(4) Installation Vulnerability Factors 3-18
3-2. Prevent 3-19
a. Operations Security 3-20
b. Personnel Security 3-20
(1) Personnel Threat Assessment 3-20
(2) Personnel Security Program Preparation 3-21
c. Physical Security 3-22
3-3. Prepare 3-22
a. Plan 3-22
b. Organize 3-22
c. Train 3-22
d. Equip 3-24
e. Maintain Readiness 3-24
(1) Organizational Readiness 3-24
(2) Operational Readiness 3-24

Section II. REACTIVE PHASE

3-4. Initial Action Stage 3-26
3-5. Action Stage 3-27
a. Negotiation 3-27
b. Tactical Action/Intervention Stage 3-28
3-6. Post Action Stage
   a. Processing and Debriefing
   b. Protection of the Incident Scene
   c. Investigation of the Incident
   d. Documentation
   e. Filing and Prosecution of Cases
   f. Training and Restraining
   g. Damage Compensation and Rehabilitation

CHAPTER 4. CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

Section I. NATIONAL LEVEL ORGANIZATION

4-1. General
4-2. Peace and Order Council (POC)
4-3. Crisis Management Committee
4-4. AFP/PNP Organization at National Level

Section II. LOWER LEVEL CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

4-5. Lower Level Peace and Order Council
4-6. Lower Level Crisis Management Committee
   a. Lower Level CMC Organization
   b. Composition of Lower Level CMC
   c. Functions of Lower Level CMC
4-7. AFP/PNP Organizations at Lower Levels
   a. Philippine National Police
   b. Philippine Army
   c. Philippine Air Force
   d. Philippine Navy
Section III. CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

4-8. Organizational Levels
   a. National
   b. Regional
   c. Provincial
   d. City/Municipal
   e. On-Scene Command Post
   f. Crisis Management Action Groups
      (1) Negotiation Group
      (2) Operations Group
      (3) Service Support Group
      (4) Public Affairs Group
4-9. Crisis Management Organization Ad Hoc Chart
4-10. National Level Crisis Management Organization
4-11. Provincial Level Crisis Management Organization
4-12. City/Municipal Level Crisis Management Organization
4-13. Crisis Management Operation Center
4-14. On-Scene Command Post
4-15. Crisis Management Action Groups
   A. Negotiation Group
      (1) Negotiation Team
      (2) Liaison Team
   b. Operations Group
      (1) Security Units/Elements
      (2) Tactical Action/Intervention Units
   c. Service Support Group
      (1) Legal/Investigation Team
      (2) Intelligence Team
      (3) Communication Electronics Team
      (4) Logistics Team
      (5) Medical Team
(6) Fire-Fighting Team 4-25
(7) Administrative Support Team 4-25
d. Public Affairs Group 4-25
(1) Public Information Team 4-25
(2) Media Control Team 4-25
(3) Community Relations 4-26
4-16. Inter-Agency Relationship at the Lower Levels 4-26

CHAPTER 5. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION

Section I. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION PROCEDURES 5-1
5-1. Hostage-Taking Situation 5-1
5-2. Categories of Hostages 5-1
5-3. Categories of Hostage-Takers 5-2
   a. Criminals 5-2
   b. Mentally-Deranged Individuals 5-2
   c. Terrorists 5-2
5-4. Personality Types of Hostage Takers 5-2
   a. Most Common Disorders 5-2
   b. Quick Recognition Points 5-3
5-5. Tactics Against Hostage Takers 5-3

Section II. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION CHECK-OFF LIST

5-6. WHAT? (SITUATION) 5-7
5-7. WHERE? 5-8
5-8. WHO? 5-8
5-9. WHEN? 5-9
5-10. WHY? 5-9
5-11. HOW? 5-10
Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
National Police Commission
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
Camp Crame, Quezon City

MEMORANDUM

TO : All Concerned

SUBJECT : LETTER OF PROMULGATION

DATE : March 16, 1996

PNPM-D-O-2-96 (DHRDp) Manual on Crisis Management is validated and published by the Directorate for Human Resource and Doctrine Development, PNP in coordination with the Directorial Staff tested and evaluated by the Regional Police Commands and National Support Units.

This manual is hereby promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned effective this date.

RECAREDO A SARMIENTO II
Police Director General
Chief, PNP
FOREWORD

The primary concern of the police is crime prevention. Foremost is the preservation of life, protection of property and environment. The Police in the pursuit of his mission, oftentimes is confronted by situations when least expected unusual phenomena apparently result into crisis.

Natural or man-made they maybe, the police officer must be able to know the concepts, policies and general procedures of handling crisis situations arising from the actions of the criminals, terrorist elements, or mentally deranged individuals who use violence, threats and illegal acts to pursue their ends.

This manual provides for the conceptual framework in Crisis Management Model which is envisioned to address crisis situations resulting from peace and order problems such as terrorism and criminality. Also, this manual is designed to provide clear understanding of the interdependency of roles of the PNP, AFP and LGUs in the management and handling of crisis at lowest level possible.

Any suggestions or recommendations to improve this publication is highly encouraged. Please course through the Director, Directorate for Human Resource and Doctrine Development.

CRISOGONO REBA FRANCISCO
Police Chief Superintendent, (MNSA)
Director, Directorate for Human Resource and Doctrine Development
CHAPTER I

CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS

Section 1. GENERAL

1. The Situation:

Being located along the circum-Pacific rim of volcanoes and typhoons, the Philippines plays host to a procession of natural disasters. Volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, typhoons and tsunamis regularly wreak havoc on lives and properties.

Aggravating these natural disasters are man-made ones like civil disturbances, terrorist activities, hijacking and hostage-taking.

Such disasters naturally cause public anxiety, loss of lives and properties and cause embarrassment to the government.

Somehow, these crises situations may be predicted, prevented or their adverse effects minimized.

1-2. Purpose and Scope:

This document sets the concept, policies and general procedures for handling crisis situations to guide and assist all concerned agencies in formulating their respective crises management contingency plans and standard operating procedures (SOPs) to address threats peculiar to them.

This doctrine specifically addresses man-made crisis situations arising out of the actions of criminals, terrorist elements, or mentally-deranged individuals who use violence or threat of violence to pursue their ends.

Relatedly, the AFP/PNP, by virtue of their respective mandates, capabilities and resources become the primary “intervention agencies” which can neutralize the perpetrators.

I-3 Crisis and Emergency

Crisis, came from the Greek word crisis, which means to separate. As defined Wagnalls, crisis is a turning point in the progress of an affair or a series of events.

Through crisis is often used interchangeably with emergency, and crisis develop from an emergency and vice versa, these terms have certain degree of difference. Emergency came from the Latin word emergentia meaning a dipping; plunging. Funk and Wagnalls defined emergency as a sudden condition or state of affairs calling for immediate action.
The following schematic diagram further illustrates the difference between crisis and emergency (FIG 1):

**CRISIS**

Progressive sequence of events  
Build up of instability  
Growth of tension

Turning point  
Decision

Change  
Continuity  
Survival

**EMERGENCY**

Sudden and/or Unforeseen  
Event(s) or State of affairs

Immediate response  
Correction  
Mitigation  
Remedy

Recovery  
Restoration

**CRISIS**  
**EMERGENCY**

Figure 1. Difference between Crisis and Emergency

1.1 **Types of Crisis/Emergency**

Crises or emergencies are either man-made or natural, and categorized as follows:

a. Man-Made Crises/Emergencies

(1) Civil disturbance

(a) Violent labor strikes  
(b) Riots
(c) Anarchy
(d) Disorderly Mass Demonstrations

(2) Revolt
   (a) Mutiny
   (b) Insurrection
   (c) Coup d’etat

(3) Revolution
(4) Border incident
(5) War
   a. Conventional
   b. Nuclear

(6) Kidnapping
(7) Hijacking
   (a) Air
   (b) Sea
   (c) Land

(8) Hostage-taking
(9) Terroristic activities (bombing, arson, assassination/liquidation, extortion, intimidation, etc.)
(10) Attacks/raids on government installations/ facilities and vital facilities

(b) Natural Crises/Emergencies

(1) Fire
(2) Marine/Air Disasters
(3) Structural collapse
(4) Hazardous spills
(5) Utilities failure (power, water, telephone)
(6) Nuclear accidents
(7) Food Scarcity/famine
(8) Fuel shortage Pestilence/epidemic
(9) Pestilence/Epidemic
(10) Floods
(11) Volcanic Eruption
(12) Earthquake Tsunami
(13) Tidal Wave
(14) Typhoons
(15) Drought
1.5. General Tasking:

When a crisis arises out of man-made emergencies as described above, the Peace and Order Council at the appropriate level shall be the organizational body that shall primarily act on the crisis situation.

When a crisis results from aircraft hijacking, disturbances in the civil aviation, or terrorism that has national significance, the National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking and Anti-Terrorism (NACAHT) shall principally deal with the crisis situation.

When crises occurs as a result of natural disasters or calamities, the organization that shall primarily address the same will be the National Disaster Coordinating Council and its subordinate entities. The disaster management activities in this regard shall then be governed separately by Presidential Decree No. 1566 dated June 11, 1978 and its implementing rules, regulations and policies.

This manual applies to crisis situation resulting from peace and order problems as terrorism and criminality.

Section II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1-6 The 4P Crisis Management Model

Crisis incidents occur when they are least expected. What make these incidents crises situations is when they go out of control and cause destruction to lives property or endanger public safety. The 4P Crisis Management Model is envisioned dress crises situations in two-phases the Proactive and the Reactive in four Prediction, Prevention, Preparation and Performance.

1-7 Phases of Crisis Management

Crisis management is continuing activity that has two distinct phases: The may and the Re-active phase.

a. The Proactive Phase. This phase is designed to predict or prevent the probability of occurrence the same time prepare to handle them when they occur. It encompasses 3Ps of the 4P Crisis Management Model prediction, prevention

(1) Prediction

This stage involves foretelling of the likelihood of crises occurring or man-made through the continuous assessment of the all possible threats and threats groups, as well as the analysis of developing or reported events and incidents. Crises incidents can be predicted through updated inputs from intelligence reports as well as the continuous monitoring and analysis of the confluence of related events.

In case of man-made crises/emergencies, and some natural crises/emergencies, this stage requires continuous study of the targets of existing threats, specifically the threat groups, their probable targets and the vulnerabilities of critical installations and facilities.
All threats and threat groups should be considered whether they are internal or external to any organization or facility.

(2) Prevention

When most man-made crises/emergencies, this stage involves the institution of passive and active security measures, as well as the remedy or solution of destabilizing factors and insecurity flaws leading to such crises/emergencies.

On the other hand, most natural crises/emergencies at this stage require vigilance and alertness to signs and manifestations of developing crises/emergencies. Warning/alert systems have to be established to increase the chances or odds of preventing the occurrences of crises/emergencies.

Preventive actions may well be applied to both natural and manmade crises/emergencies to prevent them from developing to uncontrollable proportions.

(3) Prepare

Preparation for crises/emergencies entails planning, organization, training and stockpiling of equipments and supplies needed for such crises/emergencies.

Simulated drills at unspecified days and times test the effectiveness of preparations, bring out flaws and weaknesses, and corrections/remedies effected to heighten levels of readiness of systems, procedures, organization, equipment and logistics to better cope with actual crises/emergencies.

b. The Reactive Phase - Performance

This phase covers the last of the 4Ps, Performance, which is the actual execution or implementation of any of contingency plan when a crisis situation occurs despite the pro-active measures.

The objectives in this stage are: to ensure a high probability of success in neutralizing the perpetrator(s); to minimize, or cushion the adverse effects of the crisis incident; and, to ensure a smooth and speedy rehabilitation or return to normalcy.

The performance of crisis management action for terrorist-based crises! management is done in three stages:

(1) Initial Action

All Unit Commanders are required to understand and acquaint themselves on Crisis Management doctrine. As such, they will be held responsible for all their actions. Any military/police unit taking cognizance of a crisis incident shall immediately undertake appropriate actions to contain the crisis situation and report the matter to the cognizant agencies through channels, regardless such crisis situation is within or beyond its capability to handle.

The initial action includes monitoring of the progress of the incident, securing the scene, protecting itself, establishing perimeter security, evacuating innocent civilians, if possible, preventing the escape of the perpetrators, until the designated security and tactical elements/units augment its unit as they arrive. Other than the
aforecited tasks, the initial action unit shall not engage in any tactical action against the perpetrators except in its own defense.

(2) Action

The action phase begins as soon as the On-Scene Command Post (OSCP) is established and the Tactical intervention, service support units, Negotiations Teams and the Public Affairs personnel arrive and are deployed. The On-Scene Commander (OSC) gradually relieves the initial action unit commander and completes staffing of the OSCP. The OSC discusses the incident with the commanders and staff of the units and agencies involved and plans what actions to take and establish positive contact with Crisis Management Committee (CMC) to ensure that all his succeeding actions are cleared. The action phase consists of two distinct activities: negotiation and tactical action/intervention which may take place independently either simultaneously or in succession; In any case, however, both activities are under the complete control and supervision of the On-Scene Commander.

(3) Post Action

This stage begins as soon as the perpetrators surrender, or when they are captured or neutralized and the crisis situation is deemed cleared. The on scene Commander ensures that necessary Post Action activities are undertaken to restore normalcy and bring responsible to court. (See Fig. 2)
FIG. 2 4P Crisis Management Model (CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK)
CHAPTER 2
CRISIS MANAGEMENT POLICIES

Section 1. NATIONAL SECURITY

2-1. Subscription to Anti-Terrorism Covenants

The Republic of the Philippines subscribes to all international conventions and initiatives against terrorism and will participate in all endeavors designed to strengthen international cooperation in order to prevent and neutralize terroristic acts.

2-2. Coordinated and Calculated Response Against Terrorism

The government shall effectively utilize the National Peace and Order Council (NPOC) through the Crisis Management Committees to undertake comprehensive planning and research in order to develop a coordinated and calculated response against terrorism, in accordance with our culture, values and justice system.

2-3. Terrorism Considered a Criminal Act

The government considers all terrorist actions, regardless of motivation, as criminal acts and shall undertake all lawful measures to prevent same and bring to justice those who commit such terroristic acts.

2-4. Lawful Means and Peaceful Resolution of Crisis

The government shall exhaust all lawful means and seek peaceful resolution of any crisis in order to minimize, if not prevent the loss of lives and destruction of properties. However, it will not accede to blackmail or terrorist demands nor grant concession.

2-5. Crisis Situation Involving Foreign Nationals

In crisis situations involving foreign nationals or in crisis incidents inside embassies or foreign occupied facilities, the government will act in accordance with existing bilateral understanding or agreement with the foreign government involved. In the absence of such understanding or agreement, the government will act in accordance with its policies and maintain close contract and coordination with the foreign government whose personnel or property are involved.

2-6. Involvement of Filipino Nationals in Crisis Incidents Abroad

Similarly, if Filipino nationals are involved as perpetrators in similar incidents in foreign countries, the government will also maintain close and continuous contact with the host government and provide requested information relevant to the situation. If Filipino nationals are the victims, the government shall provide the necessary assistance for their immediate relief or repatriation to the Philippines.
Section II. DND-AFPIDILG-PNP POLICY

2-7. General

In addressing crises situations, the Crisis Management Organizations and the military/police shall be generally guided by the foregoing national policies and strictly implement same.

2-8. Graduated Armed Response

Armed actions shall be employed in a graduated manner only after exhausting all peaceful means, using appropriate and necessary means commensurate to the situation.

2-9. No Compromise with Terrorists

The government will not compromise nor make concessions to terrorists even if it involves its personnel and property. The government will act promptly, decisively and effectively, choosing from the whole range of military/police actions appropriate to the circumstances.

2-10. Handling Hostage Situations

a. The AFP/PNP shall ensure the safety of civilian hostage(s) as a paramount consideration that shall take precedence over all others;

b. Understand and minimize the mental anguish and agony of the victims’ family, relatives and friends;

c. Achieve the early liberation of the hostage(s) or victim(s);

d. Ensure the recovery and return of the loot or the fruits of the crime;

e. Ensure the successful case build-up and prosecution of cases against the perpetrator(s)/suspect(s); and

f. Attain effective integration of the efforts of the operating units for optimum results, to minimize duplication and unnecessary competition and promote efficiency.

2-11. Respect for Human Rights

In all their actions in any crisis situation, all AFP/PNP personnel shall respect the human rights of the victims and the perpetrators. Unit commanders shall be held responsible that no human rights violations shall take place in the course of its operations and in handling of those involved in any crisis.

2-12. Development of AFP/PNP’ Nationwide Capability to Cope with Terrorist-based Crises/Emergencies

The AFP major services and the PNP shall organize, train, equip and maintain special units based at GHQ, AFP and NHQ, PNP; with capability for nationwide deployment.
2-13. Handling of Crisis at the Lowest Levels Possible

All terrorist-based crises/emergencies which are basically police matters, shall be handled as much as possible, at the lowest level and resolved at the earliest possible time.

2-14. Organization of AFP, PNP Special Action/Reaction Units at all Levels

Basically, pertinent provisions of Executive Order No. 216 series of 1995 shall govern the organization of AFP and/or PNP units reacting to terrorist-based crises/emergencies.

2-15. Development of AFP/PNP Anti-Terrorism Doctrines

The AFP/PNP shall continuously develop doctrines, concepts and procedures for containing terrorism taking into consideration our own culture, values and justice system.

2-16. Guidelines in Addressing Crisis Situations Arising from Threats to National Security Pursuant to Executive Order No. 216, s. 1995

a. General Principles

(1) The AFP shall be employed to address external security threats and such other threats posed by organized armed groups on the national security and territorial integrity requiring the employment of large tactical units and military weaponry. The PNP shall support the AFP in the accomplishment of this function, and shall, in certain instances, initially confront until such time that the AFP shall have deployed units/elements for the purpose. (As practicable, the PNP units/elements shall furnish the APP its holdings and assessments on the particular threat to ensure its continuity and to preclude the occurrences of a security gap).

(2) The PNP shall enforce laws and ordinances and perform other law enforcement functions. In the performance of these functions, it shall have unimpeded access to the operational area upon prior coordination, and it may call upon, and shall be assisted by the APP. However, the APP and its units and personnel shall not have law enforcement authority unless the exercise of such is in support of the PNP or other law enforcement agency or as a private citizen within the purview of Section 6 of Rule 113 of the Rules of the Court.

(3) The PNP shall play a supportive role to the APP during national emergencies, including disasters and calamities.

(4) In the performance of their respective functions, the spirit of cooperation, coordination and accommodation shall prevail. Direct liaison, including regular interservice intelligence exchanges and socials among those concerned is encouraged.
(5) Service courtesies, particularly in regard to those accorded rank and seniority, shall be observed among personnel of both the P1P and APP, especially during the conduct of official business.

(6) Whenever units/elements of both the AFP and the PNP are involved in an internal security operation, the unit/element of the agency with the primary role shall have operational direction and supervision over the units and elements of the agency playing the supportive role. The same procedure shall immediately be assumed in the case of conjunction of units/elements of the two agencies in the course of independent operations.

(7) The units/elements of one agency placed in support of the unit?element of the other agency shall continue to perform its primary mission and statutory functions. Such support unit/element shall provide sufficient assistance in terms of personnel and resources without jeopardizing the accomplishment of its primary mission and statutory functions.

b. Strategic Concept

(1) Pursuant to RA 6975, the DILG-PNP assumes primary responsibility of preserving the internal security of the State to include the suppression of insurgency effective 1 January 1995. However, by virtue of Executive Order Nr. 216, the DND-AFP is called upon to assume primary responsibility for preserving the internal security in certain areas of the country, as may be determined by the President upon recommendation of the Peace and Order Council.

(2) Notwithstanding the retention of primary responsibility over the internal security in certain areas by the DND-AFP, eventual compliance with the intent and spirit of the law (i.e., DILG-PNP to have primary responsibility) shall be sought.

(3) Pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act Nr. 6975 and Section 5 of Executive Order Nr. 216, s. 94, the President, upon the recommendation of the appropriate Peace and Order Council, may call upon the AFP to assume the primary role in other areas or approve turn-over of the same to the PNP in others, depending upon the internal security situation in each particular area.

(4) The turn-over of primary responsibility for internal security from the PNP to the AFP and vice versa in accordance with the procedures and parameters provided in these guidelines shall be in increments of at least a whole province.

(5) General law enforcement functions nationwide shall be the primary concern of the DILG-PNP.
3.1. Predict

The first and foremost concern of crisis management is to be able to predict the likelihood of crises occurring through the continuous gathering/updating of inputs analysis of the threat. The inputs consist basically of Intelligence and Events.

a. Intelligence

This involves collection, evaluation, processing, updating dissemination of information obtained from all possible sources. Intelligence for this management may be categorized as strategic, tactical and operational. The requirements and sources of intelligence are indicated below.

(1) Strategic Intelligence (International Threat Groups)

(a) Requirements
- Identity of Groups, leaders and members, known travel, recruitment
- Background, organizations, training, financing, logistics: support, weapons
- Usual areas of operation, international connections. state support
- Usual methods of operation
- Likely targets

(b) Sources

- Police and military
- Diplomatic channels
- Friendly intelligence
- Press
- Clandestine reporting

(2) Tactical Intelligence (Local / operating threat groups)

(a) Requirements (Same as Strategic Intelligence)
(b) Sources

- Police and military
- Intelligence Service
- Captured/surrendered members of threat groups
- Concerned citizens
- Press

(3) Operational Intelligence (Needed for Specific Incident)

(a) Requirements

- Number, location, identities and background of threat groups
- Number, location, identities and background of hostages
- Weapons and explosives in the hands of threat groups
- Detailed information on site of the incident and environs

  * Building design and construction, floor plans, utilities, locks, access points
  * Aircraft design and construction, communication equipment on board, and access points
    * Ship design and construction, communication equipment on board
    * Vehicle design and construction
    * Terrain features of area and access routes
    * Airfield data
    * Weather data

(b) Sources

- Observers at scene
- Witnesses at scene when incident began
- Building plans
- Aircraft design plans and airport layout, designers
- Security and maintenance personnel
- Airport and airline personnel
- Released or escaped hostages
- Hostage negotiators
- Technical operators
- Ship design and layout, naval architecture

b. Events

All significant information on events/incidents which could have been on the types of crises herein addressed or data obtained during occurrence of similar incidents or actual crisis, serve as inputs which can facilitate analyses necessary for the identification of probable threat groups and targets, or for formulating preventive measures, security procedures and probable courses of action when similar incidents occur.

c. Threat Analysis

AFP/PNP units must be able to identify the threat, its nature, characteristics, operational capabilities and probable targets and know their vulnerabilities so that steps can be taken to keep a potential threat from becoming reality. Threats may come in the form of kidnapping, assassination, ambuscade arson, bombing, takeover of vital or high-value installations or disruption of important national/international events.

d. The Threat Groups

(1) Broad Categories of Threat Groups

(a) Political Terrorists

These are ideologically-inspired individuals or groups. They want prestige and power for a collective goal or higher cause. Many of its members have extensive criminal backgrounds. They often recruit new members from prisons, beginning their indoctrination and training while still confined thereat. These recruits see membership in the terrorist group as an opportunity to exercise violent behavior and they have pathological need for the support and identification provided by group membership.

The CPP/NPA, MILF and MNLF Lost Command are basically considered as belonging to the category of political terrorists, being called Dissident Terrorists (DTs) and Southern Philippine Terrorists (SPTs), respectively. The ultra armed elements are likewise classified under this category. While these groups advocate different ideologies, their characteristics, organizations, and modus operandi are similar in that they may follow violent patterns of terrorist actions such as hostage takings, assassinations, bombing of buildings, bridges and power lines, arsons, ambuscade, etc.

(b) Criminals
These are people who commit terrorists acts for personal either than ideological gain. Some of their terroristic acts such as kidnapping or extortion, are planned. Others are not planned, but happen as a result of the confrontation and encounter with law enforcement agencies to an on-going crime. For instance, a number of bank robberies have evolved into hostage-taking situations when policemen arrive in response to an alarm while the robbery is still in progress.

(c) Mentally-Damaged Individuals

These people commit terrorists acts during a period of psychiatric disturbance. This type maybe the most difficult terrorists to deal with. Many of them are impulsive and unpredictable.

(d) Religious Extremists

Mainly belonging to Southern Religious Fundamentalists orient of other faiths, they are apt to execute hostages belonging to other religious groups.

(e) Economically-motivated groups/individuals mainly belonging labor groups. Depending on their ideological orientations, motivations and long understanding situation, recourse to violence may be resorted to many reasons favorable them.

(2) Terrorist Characteristics

(a) Common Characteristics - The following are characteristics common to terrorist groups:
- They promote fear.
- Usually militarily weaker than the opposing security force.
- Do not necessarily equate tactical with mission success. Publicly may be the main terrorist objective.
- Highly mobile.
- Exploit the fact that terror is cheap. A few perpetrators with inexpensive small arms can create disruptions affecting whole nations.
- Possess limited resources.
- Operate most often under cover.
- Believe small groups means security and efficiency.

(3) Threat Characteristics Matrix - The threat characteristics are categorized into four: ORGANIZATIONAL (FIG 4), BEHAVIORAL (FIG 5), RESOURCE (FIG 6) AND OPERATIONAL (FIG 7).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIG 4</th>
<th>ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERS</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>RECRUITMENT</th>
<th>FINANCING</th>
<th>INTERNATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLITICALLY MOTIVATED THREAT GROUPS</td>
<td>TERRORIST GROUP</td>
<td>WELL ORGANIZED, HEIRARCHICAL, BUREAUCRATIC, SPECIALIZATION COMMON, COMPARTMENTALIZED</td>
<td>UNIVERSITIES, PRISONS VOCATIONAL TRAINING CENTERS, REFUGEE CAMPS, ETHIC GROUPS AND IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS</td>
<td>ROBBERY, KIDNAPPING EXTORTION, ETC., DONATIONS BY: FOREIGN COUNTRIES, ASSOCIATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS OWN ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES</td>
<td>TRAINING, POLITICAL SUPPORT AND FINANCING FROM OTHER COUNTRIES VERY HIGH, EXTENSIVE CONTACT BETWEEN GROUPS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>EXTREMIST PROTEST GROUP</td>
<td>RANGE FROM NON-FORMAL TO WELL ORGANIZED</td>
<td>HIGH SCHOOLS, UNIVERSITIES AND PRISONS</td>
<td>ROBBERY, FRAUD, LEGITIMATE JOBS, DONATIONS and ASSISTANCE</td>
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<td>ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPS</td>
<td>EFFICIENT, HIERARCHICAL, BUREAUCRATIC</td>
<td>CLAN, FAMILY</td>
<td>EXTORTION GAMBLING, DRUGS, PROSTITUTION, USURY, KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, THEFT, ARSON ETC.</td>
<td>VARIES</td>
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<td>LITTLE OR NONE</td>
<td>OFTEN ALONE</td>
<td>ROBBERY, THEFT, EXTORTION, LIQUIDATION/ASSANITION, ETC.</td>
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<td>DISORIENTED PERSONS</td>
<td>NONE EXCEPT FOR PSYCHOTIC CULT</td>
<td>OFTEN ALONE</td>
<td>PERSONAL FUNDS</td>
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<td>SPIRITUALLY MOTIVATED PERSONS</td>
<td>FANATIC GROUPS</td>
<td>TIGHTLY-ORGANIZED HIERARCHICAL</td>
<td>CLAN, FAMILY, ACQUAINTANCES, ETHIC GROUPS, RELIGIOUS GROUPS</td>
<td>INDIVIDUAL/FAMILY CONTRIBUTIONS, TITHES, ROBBERY, EXTORTION, KIDNAPPING</td>
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<td>LITTLE OR NONE</td>
<td>OFTEN ALONE</td>
<td>PERSONAL FUNDS</td>
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<td>DISGRUNTLED GROUPS</td>
<td>HIGHLY ORGANIZED HIERARCHICAL BUREAUCRATIC COMPARTMENTALIZED</td>
<td>WITHIN LABOR UNIONS</td>
<td>UNION FUNDS, DONATIONS BY FOREIGN LABOR UNIONS/GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS</td>
<td>FINANCING TRAINING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FIG 5</strong></td>
<td><strong>BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERS</strong></td>
<td><strong>POLITICALLY MOTIVATED THREAT GROUPS</strong></td>
<td><strong>EXTREMIST PROTEST GROUP</strong></td>
<td><strong>CRIMINALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>MENTALLY DERANGED INDIVIDUALS</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>TERRORIST GROUP</td>
<td>POLITICALLY CENTERED AND ISSUE ORIENTED</td>
<td>ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPS</td>
<td>DISORIENTED PERSONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MOTIVATION</td>
<td>POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL</td>
<td>MODERATE</td>
<td>FINANCIAL GAIN PERSONAL POWER</td>
<td>FUNCTION OF INDIVIDUAL MENTAL DISORDER</td>
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<td>LOW</td>
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<td>VERY HIGH</td>
<td>NOT GENERALLY SUICIDAL BUT WILLING TO DIE IF NECESSARY</td>
<td>MODERATE</td>
<td>VARIES</td>
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<td>WILLINGNESS TO DIE</td>
<td>VERY LOW</td>
<td>VERY LOW</td>
<td>VERY LOW</td>
<td>VARI AS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIG 6 RESOURCE CHARACTERS</td>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td>GROUP SIZE</td>
<td>WEAPONS</td>
<td>TRANSPORTATION</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICALLY MOTIVATED THREAT GROUPS</strong></td>
<td>TERRORIST GROUP</td>
<td>HIGH LEVEL OF TRAINING</td>
<td>1 – 6</td>
<td>HANDGUNS, EXPLOSIVES, CHEMICALS AND POISONS</td>
<td>PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TRANSPORTATION, ON FOOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXTREMIST PROTEST GROUP</td>
<td>MODERATE</td>
<td>FEW TO THOUSANDS</td>
<td>-DO-</td>
<td>-DO-</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>CRIMINALS</strong></td>
<td>ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPS</td>
<td>HIGH LEVEL OF TRAINING</td>
<td>1 – 6</td>
<td>HANDGUNS, AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES</td>
<td>-DO-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUALS</td>
<td>LOW LEVEL OF TRAINING</td>
<td>OFTEN ALONE</td>
<td>HANDGUNS, SMALL ARMS</td>
<td>-DO-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>MENTALLY DERANGED INDIVIDUALS</strong></td>
<td>DISORIENTED</td>
<td>VARIES</td>
<td>ALONE</td>
<td>-DO-</td>
<td>-DO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPIRITUALLY MOTIVATED PERSONS</strong></td>
<td>FANATIC GROUPS</td>
<td>VARIES</td>
<td>20 – UP</td>
<td>MOSTLY HOME-MADE FOR SOME GROUPS, ASSAULT RIFLES, RECEILLES, LMGs, GRENADE LAUNCHERS, GRENADES</td>
<td>PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TRANSPORTATION, ON FOOT</td>
</tr>
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<td>FANATIC INDIVIDUALS</td>
<td>MODERATE LEVEL FOR EXTREMISTS; LOW LEVEL TO NONE FOR SOME</td>
<td>OFTEN ALONE</td>
<td>BLADED AND MOSTLY HOME-MADE FOR SOME; PISTOLS AND REVOLVERS FOR EXTREMISTS</td>
<td>-DO-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECONOMICALLY MOTIVATED THREAT GROUPS</strong></td>
<td>DISGRUNTED GROUPS</td>
<td>VARIES</td>
<td>FEW TO HUNDREDS</td>
<td>HANDGUNS, PILL BOXES EXPLOSIVES</td>
<td>-DO-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(4) Terrorist Goals

(a) Immediate Goals

- Obtain worldwide, national, or local recognition for their cause;
- Cause government reaction, over-reaction, and repression leading to immediate public dissension;
- Harass, weaken or embarrass government, military police or other security forces;
- Show government’s inability to protect its citizenry;
- Obtain money or equipment;
- Disrupt or destroy means of mobility or communications;
- Demonstrate power or threat credibility;
- Prevent or delay executive decisions or legislations;
- Cause strikes or work slowdown;
- Discourage impending foreign investments or foreign government assistance programs or important events;
- Influence elections;
- Free prisoners; and
- Satisfy vengeance
(b) Long-Range Goals

- Cause dramatic changes in government such as revolution, civil war or war between nations;
- Turn the tide favorably to their side during guerrilla warfare;
- Influence local, national, or international policy decisions.. and
- Gain political recognition as the legal body representing an ethnic, national, religious or political group.

(5) Terrorist Groups

(a) Cooperation Among Terrorist Groups

Today, there is apparent worldwide conspiracy among the groups. This include sharing of resources, expertise, and safe havens.. joint cooperation. Certain foreign governments have encouraged cooperation. terrorist groups. These governments provide logistical supports, organize between leaders from different groups, and assist in operations. These government consider the use of terrorism as a cheaper alternative to conventional essence, that terrorist groups also receive assistance from social, ethnic and groups in their area of operations. These front groups collect funds from the sympathetic ‘to the terrorist group cause. They may also provide transfer intelligence, guides and safe conduct/havens for group members.

(b) Organizational of Terrorist Groups

The way a terrorist group is organized is determined by these need for security and the number of people in the group. Generally, larger arc penetrable and less secured while smaller groups can maintain a high degree often, but usually have limited operational capabilities.

- **Group Size** - Organizational growth create administrative and support burdens. The larger groups can only succeed over the long term in a weak political environment.

- **Group Security** - Government forces attempt to describe terrorist groups or keep them in defensive position to discourage them from mobilize new terror. To reduce the effectiveness of the government agencies, terrorist must be extremely covert.

(6) Terrorist Operations

Terrorist operation are covert and well-executed. They are usually carried out by specially-trained, specially-equipped and specially-organized clandestine elements.
(a) Weapons

Terrorist usually use basic arms and explosives during operations. However, they continue to seek access to advanced weaponry.

(b) Training

Terrorist often undertake training activities away from their homeland, usually in countries known to be sympathetic to terrorist activities. They really train on subversion, weaponry, infiltration and negotiation practices. Generally, specially-trained terrorist are of above-average intelligence.

(c) Methods

Terrorists usually operate as small bands of trained personnel carrying light automatic weapons, hand grenades, basic explosives, light rations, ammunition for several days and light communication equipment. They mask their activities by merging with the local populace. Teams include assault and security elements. Leaders serve as negotiators. During the hostage-taking/barricading, kidnapping, or skyjacking personnel of both assault and security elements take turns at providing security. They warn the victims and watch entrances and exits. They watch out for counter-terrorist sites, maintain their fields of fire and keep their weapons loaded and ready. Hostages are usually separated to prevent connivance/cooperation, escape planning, or intelligence gathering.

(d) Sequence of Terrorist Actions

Pre-Incident

Pre-operational activities include reconnaissance missions, thirty periods of training, and rehearsals. Plans are conceived by the command centers while target and area reconnaissance teams and actual perpetrators do not exist. Information is passed down through intermediaries, liaisons, or by message drops. Most terrorist contingency plans include alternative targets, alternative negotiation demands, departure or escape routes and reassembly points.

Initiation Phase

It is this phase that terrorist move to their target covertly, singly or in pairs along separate routes. They use fictitious names, fake identification papers and passports. Weapons and other items are sent separately to pre-arranged locations where they are to be given to perpetrators.

When the terrorist decide that a hostage/barricade or other similar undertaking is a worthwhile endeavor, they may use the negotiation phase to gain publicity. The negotiation may include certain specific demands that often require inter-government negotiations at the highest level. There may be trade-off, especially when the demands are more than the government is able to meet. Conversely, there
may be no negotiations at all and the climax phase could immediately follow the initiation phase.

**Post-Incident Phase**

During the post-incident phase, the terrorist members regroup, critique and criticize the operation. They learn their successes and failures. This learning is often shared with other terrorist groups.

**(7) Terrorist Tactics**

**(a) Bombing**

- Delivery to target is done through:
  - Vehicle Bombs - Booby trapped vehicles with attached devices and car bombs.
  - Laid Charges - bombs placed by hand.
  - Projected Bombs - bombs thrown by hand, launched from rifles, or projected by a mortar device.
  - Postal/Mail Bombs - bombs sent through letters, parcels and other items sent by mail.

**Activation means**

Command Activation - by radio, electric leads, pull wire, or mechanical strikers.

Action by the Subject/Target - Trip wire, pressure device, light sensitive device, electric switch.

Time Delay - clock, burning, fuse, chemical delay, atmospheric pressure.

**(b) Arson**

This is used to destroy or disrupt targets such as public utilities, official headquarters, economic and industrial facilities.

**(c) Hijacking**

Hijacking and skyjacking are very popular means used by the Terrorists. Terrorists hijack vehicles with supply, ammunition, fuel cargoes. Hijacked a closed military installation. Skyjacking of commercial aircraft, on the other hand, ~an(ee pu6accty nor the terrors.

**(d) Assassination/Liquidation**

This is the oldest but still the most widely used terrorist tactic. Targets are often predictable, and invariably, the terrorist will claim responsibility for the assassination. All three categories of terrorists operate against government officials,
(e) Ambush

This is a well-planned, generally well-thought-out, properly rehearsed and precisely executed operation. The terrorist have time on his side and will spend considerable time preparing for an operation. Terrorists have an advantage in that they can choose their time and place on operation.

(f) Kidnapping

Kidnapping for ransom is the most common form of this tactics. The victim is normally confined in a secret hideaway and the kidnapper makes material demands.

(g) Hostage- Taking

The hostage-taker confronts the authorities and openly holds the victims for ransom. His demands are often more than just material in mature. Political concessions are frequently demanded in exchange for the hostages’ lives media. Second, the fact that live hostages are involved increases the drama of the event, thus pressure can be applied by the terrorists to force accessions hostage is a tangible-asset to the terrorist, something with which to bargain.

(h) Robbery/ Extortion

Terrorist operations are expensive. To help finance their activities, terrorist rob banks and armoured vehicles and persons carrying large sums of cash. Bank robberies are also used as graduation exercises for terrorist training programs and viewed as a tactical operation. They conduct reconnaissance, plan escape routes and operate with a high degree of efficiency.

(i) Progressive Taxation

The progressive taxation scheme of the CPP/NPA is a form of extortion through coercion or use of force against the victim or his property.

(j) Raids/Attacks

Target may not necessarily be vital, isolated or large ones what is important is the raid/attack will attract public/media attention

(8) Terrorist Targets

(a) Military/Police
To the terrorist, the military, para-military and police elements are sources of arms, explosives and other weaponry. Attacks against the military seen as the protective element of the political or national body the terrorist is attempting terrorist effort Military/Police targets of the terrorists include:

- Sensitive weapons
- Arms and ammunition depots
- Command and control facilities
- Logistical/Storage facilities
- Explosives

(b) Engineering and Energy Systems
- Hydroelectric plans
- Offshore oil rigs
- Nuclear facility sites
- Gas pipelines
- Dams and electric power lines

(c) Communication and Supplies
- Communication lines and facilities
- Chemical storage sites
- Dock facilities
- Equipment warehouses
- Computer facilities

(d) Transportation
- Rail lines and cars
- Bus depots
- Airports and aircrafts
- Trucking facilities
- Shipyards and ships
- Main land routes and bridges

(e) Human
- Members of the Diplomatic Corps
- Government officials
- Corporate Executives
- Police
- Military personnel
- Dependents/close relatives/sympathizers of the above

(e. Vulnerabilities

These are the weaknesses in installation security and the high risk target within such installation. These vulnerabilities are normally identified in government
and military/police installations and facilities through security surveys and inspections conducted periodically or on-the-spot by intelligence and security units/staffs. The analysis of the threats to certain installation are based on information with both static and dynamic dimensions.

(1) Static Dimensions

(a) Terrain
(b) Nationality of Population
(c) Major Industry in the Area
(d) Location of Installation
(e) Installation Mission

(2) Dynamic Dimensions Controllable to Some Degree

(a) Assignment of Personnel
(b) Security Measures Used
(c) Access to Facilities
(d) Relations With Civilian Community
(e) Activities within Post Location

(3) Dynamic Dimensions that are Hardly Controllable

(a) Weather
(b) Activities of Hostile Groups
(c) Economic Conditions
(d) Off-Post Demonstrations

(4) Factors To Consider to Determine to Some Extent the Vulnerability of Some Installations

The vulnerability of installations can be determined to some through the consideration of the following factors:

(a) Installation Characteristics and its attractiveness as a target for terrorist's acts
(b) Status of Training of personnel
(c) Availability of Communications
(d) Time and distance from military/police installations able to lend assistance
(e) Time and distance from urban areas
(f) Geographical regions
(g) Proximity to foreign borders
(h) Access to installations
(i) Population Density
(j) Terrain

2. Prevent (Fig 8)
Based on the results of the Prediction activities, concerned agencies, business concerns and individuals establish passive and active security measures and systems, lessen the chances of success of terrorist-based crises/emergencies.

Additionally, systems and measures warning of the advent of crises/emergencies may have to be established to prevent them from turning to full-blown proportions needing massive responses. Lastly, prophylactic actions may have to be undertaken to reverse or neutralize threat or threat groups.

**FIG. 8**

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**a. Operations Security**

This pertains to the institution of proper security measures in the performance of assigned unit missions and during military/police operations. Precautionary measures must be taken into consideration to prevent the potential threat groups from the unit plans and operations. The techniques of information security, physical security and the signal security and deception which are considered interrelated and simultaneous must be continuously applied. The key to an effective operations security system: protecting information to provides awareness of the threats and denies the threat group an opportunity to obtain sensitive information that can be used of installation. Awareness and training likewise adds to the effectiveness of the program.

**b. Personnel Security**

This pertains to the protection of personnel against subversion and blackmail. All personnel are generally susceptible to the threat of terrorist attack. They become terrorist targets not necessarily because of who they are but of where and what happen to be. Good preventive or precautionary measures can decrease the threat these attacks. Terrorist also select specific people as targets for kidnapping, hostage-taking and assassination. They gather extensive intelligence information the personalities targeted through extensive surveillance.

**(1) Consideration on Personnel Threat Assessment**
(a) Rank and Risk

In general, higher ranking personnel have greater risk levels high threat areas, special measures must be taken to secure high-ranking officer dignitaries and their dependents. Some personnel may be selected as terrorist target by expertise or special knowledge they possess.

(b) Threat Level

Personnel who are considered as potential targets may categorized into primary, secondary or random targets.

Primary targets usually include ranking military/police office government officials, foreign dignitaries, other VIPs and individuals possess sensitive information. They are normally selected or their publicity value to the terrorists.

Secondary targets are those selected as alternate terrorist gets. These are personnel of lower rank and risk than the primary targets but can by terrorist for publicity. Most action taken by the CPPINPA terrorist elements against secondary targets due to their inherent exposure and easier access secondary targets are normally attacked through ambuscades, raids, and sparrow operations.

Randomly selected targets are those military/Police or law enforcement personnel who are on off-duty or engaged in private activities and become targets of opportunity.

(2) Stages of Preparation in the Personnel Security Progress

(a) Planning

This includes a threat analysis and an assessment of the available Personnel security resources. Awareness and personnel security education procedures be developed and integrated into the day-to-day unit operation and training special procedures must be developed for secondary and random targets. Special insurgency plans must be developed for visiting dignitaries and VIPs.

(b) Awareness

Military/Police, dignitaries, civilian employees and their dependents be made aware of the terrorist threat in general as the perceived threat level at respective installations. This can be achieved through periodic briefings, public formation drive and the dissemination of printed materials. The need for personnel capacity awareness must be developed at this stage.

(c) Education

The specific personnel security procedures to be followed are presented during this stage. Because logistics constraints make it impossible to protect possible terrorist targets, self-protection and effective crime prevention procedures, c
deterrent measures must be undertaken. Personnel must be informed of the various terrorist techniques used in attacking personnel such as sparrow operations, letter IT ambushes and the like.

(d) Physical Security

This pertains to the observance of physical means or measures to safeguard the installation against sabotage. Physical security encompasses protection of information, material and personnel against terrorist actions. Sufficient physical security measures have been devised to ensure the protection of military/police installation in general. Effort must be seriously exerted towards the proper and religious implementation of these measures. Physical security measures include outer and inner defence barrier protection, alarm, surveillance and guarding systems, and personnel control system.

3-3. Prepare (FIG 9)

In addition to the preventive measures being undertaken, all government agencies, military/police units and installation must have Crisis Management Action Plans to enable them to react in cases when crisis incidents occur. In general, military/police commanders must organize, train and equip special reaction, security and negotiation elements and provide procedures for their immediate activation when the need arises.

a. Plan

This stage calls for the preparation of appropriate plans to meet all foreseeable emergencies and crisis situations.

b. Organize

Crisis Management Organizations composed of police, military and government leaders are established at the national, regional, provincial and municipal levels to ensure an integrated and coordinated approach towards managing various types of crisis at all levels.

c. Train

Commanders of units designated to compose the tactical and support units and negotiation team should periodically conduct training and exercised to ensure its operational readiness. This requires the regular and progressive conduct of necessary individual training to enhance the expertise of each participant; as well as scheduled and unscheduled unit training to develop team work, precision and responsiveness in the implementation of any crisis contingency plan whether during exercises or in actual crisis situations.

FIG. 9 SCHEME OF "PREPARE" ACTIVITIES
Commanders of units designated to compose the tactical and support units and negotiation team should periodically conduct training and exercised to ensure its operational readiness. This requires the regular and progressive conduct of necessary individual training to enhance the expertise of each participant; as well as scheduled and unscheduled unit training to develop team work, precision and responsiveness in the implementation of any crisis contingency plan whether during exercises or in actual crisis situations.

**d. Equip**

AFP/PNP special action units shall acquire equipment peculiar to their functions. State-of-the-art equipment which are specially designed to crisis situations shall be programmed through the Equipment Outlay Modernization of the AFP.

**e. Maintain Readiness**
The ultimate manifestation of preparedness is the ability of the AFP etc to successfully contain any crisis incident as soon as possible with minimum resource expanded and minimum losses. To ensure a high state of preparedness, it is necessary that the AFPIPnP maintain organizational as well as operational readiness.

Organizational readiness refers to the preparedness of each individual unit organizations composing the ad hoc crisis management organization. It means that a high state of morale, discipline, and proficiency exist in these units.

Operational readiness refers to the preparedness of the entire ad hoc crisis management organization to respond with dispatch to any crisis incident. There must be utmost cooperation, coordination and effective communication among these units.

Section II. REACTIVE PHASE

When a crisis incident occurs despite the proactive efforts, AFPIPnP units concerned must be prepared to perform crisis management in accordance with their plans. This phase consists of the INITIAL ACTION, ACTION and POST-ACTION activities as shown in FIGURE 10.
3-4  Initial Action

a. The initial action is normally taken by any police/military unit taking notice of the existence of a crisis incident. This unit is referred to as the initial action unit.

b. The unit commander of the initial action unit shall perform the following procedures:

(1) Take immediate appropriate action to resolve problem. If the situation is beyond its capability to handle, the matter should be reported to the Crisis Management Committee (CMC).

(2) The unit should take the necessary measures to initially contain the situation.
(3) The unit shall monitor and report the progress of the incident until CMC takes cognizance of the situation.

(4) The unit shall likewise secure the scene, protect itself as much as possible without gunfire, establish perimeter security and command, evacuate innocent civilians if possible, and prevent escape of the perpetrators, until the tactical action/intervention elements/units gradually take over as they arrive.

(5) Other than the aforesaid tasks, the initial action unit shall not engage in any tactical action against the perpetrators except in its own defense.

(6) During this stage, the CMC shall establish the Crisis Management Operations Center (CMOC) at the appropriate AFPIPNP Headquarters’ Operations Center.

(7) The CMC shall officially declare the crisis situation and activate the military/police units, government agencies and non-government organizations included in the ad hoc crisis management organization at that level.

(8) The CMC designates the On-Scene Commander (OSC) and directs him to proceed to the crisis incident scene.

(9) The OSC establishes the On-Scene Command Post (OSCP) at a suitable area within the incident scene and informs the CMC through CMOC accordingly.

3-5 ACTION STAGE

The action phase begin as soon as the On-Scene Command Post (OSCP) is established and the Reaction/Intervention and Support units and the Negotiation Team arrive and are deployed. The On-Scene Command (OSC) relieves the initial action commander and completes staffing of the OSCP. The OSC discusses the incident with his commanders and staff and decides on the plans and actions to take. The action phase consists of two distinct and independent activities: negotiation and tactical action/intervention which can take place simultaneously or in succession.

a. NEGOTIATION

(1) The chief negotiator undertakes the negotiation as soon as he has been properly briefed and has received appropriate instruction from the OSC.

(2) He shall keep the OSCP informed of the progress of negotiations and take instructions only from the OSC.

(3) He arranges or settles by conferring or discussing with the terrorist and at mediating. His primary role is to persuade the perpetrators to make the best of bargain.

(4) The chief negotiator does not command and neither does the on-scene tactical commander negotiate.
(5) The Negotiation Team may allow intermediaries, such as national or ca. political leaders, members of the clergy, immediate family members of the perpetrators or hostages, or other respected/credible leaders in the community, to ~p in the negotiation. However, they should be supported and backed up by trained members of the negotiation Team. Likewise, the recommendation/advice of such intermediaries mayor may not be accepted by the OSC, whose decision shall be final countermanded by the Chairman, CMC or by higher competent authority.

(6) The Negotiation Team shall be composed or personnel trained and experienced in the art of negotiation.

(7) Negotiators may employ psychologists and interpreters to facilitate with the perpetrators as the situation warrants.

(8) All negotiations shall be terminated as soon as the perpetrators take hostile actions or begin killing hostages.

(9) No further negotiations shall be undertaken once the reaction intervention Unit Commander initiates tactical operation to neutralize the perpetrators.

b. Tactical Action/Intervention

(1) The Reaction Intervention Commander makes a complete on the crisis incident situation and plans his courses of action upon arrival at the scene while the negotiation is in progress.

(2) He shall maintain close and continuous contact with the OSCP and keep same informed of the development in the inner perimeter and of all tactical actions being taken.

(3) He shall take instructions only from the OSC but continuously inm the negotiation.

(4) He shall coordinate all his support requirements with the OSCP

(5) He shall exercise authority over all CMC action groups throughout the conduct of the tactical action phase.

(6) When the negotiations fail or when the perpetrators begin killing hostage or undertaking further hostile actions, the reaction intervention commander shall upon clearance with the OSC, assault or undertake appropriate tactical action again the perpetrators until they are neutralized.

(7) Hot pursuit operations may be conducted in case the perpetrators escape;

3-6. Post Action

This phase begins as' soon as the perpetrators surrender, or when they are captured or neutralized. The On-Scene Commander shall ensure that the following are accomplished:
a. Processing and Debriefing

(1) Hostages/victims
(2) Perpetrators
(3) Witnesses
(4) Key participants of the incident

b. Protection of the Incident Scene

The incident scene must be cordoned and protected to prevent looters and evidence as necessary.

c. Investigation of the Incident

The investigation of the incident must proceed and shall be completed as possible as part of the necessary documents for filing the case in court.

d. Documentation

(1) Sworn Statements of the following:

(a) Witnesses
(b) Hostages
(c) Perpetrators
(d) Key participants in the incidents

(2) Recovery and preservation of evidences
(3) Preservation of pictorials, video coverage and all written records.
(4) Post-Incident Reports

e. Filing and Prosecution of Cases

After all the necessary documentations are completed, the case shall be filed in court and the perpetrators are prosecuted.

f. Training and Retraining of Units/ Personnel

Special units and negotiators shall continue with their training in order to improve their proficiency and enhance their readiness.

g. Damage Compensation and Rehabilitation

(1) Initiates recommendation for the compensation, and provide appropriate assistance to civilian killed or injured during the tactical operations.
(2) Initiate recommendation for the rehabilitation/construction of destroyed properties and essential infrastructures.
CHAPTER 4

CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

Section 1. NATIONAL LEVEL ORGANIZATION

4-1 General

As a matter of policy, natural calamities and disasters will be the responsibilities the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC). Terrorist-based crises/emergencies on the other hand will be the responsibility of the National Peace and Order Council (NPOC).

Lower level organizations of the NDCC and NPOC shall likewise be organized to take cognizance of responsibilities ascribed in their national organs.

4. 2 National Peace and Order Council (NPOC) (FIG. H)

The National Peace and Order Council (NPOC) addresses various aspects of the national security particularly those affecting peace and order. Peace and Order Councils are likewise established at the regional, provincial and city/municipalities levels to perform same functions at such levels.

To facilitate the disposition of cases, coordination with the National Council for the Administration of Justice (NCAl) shall be undertaken by the NPOC.

4. 3 Crisis Management Committee (CMC) (FIG. 11)

a. In accordance with Executive Order 320, the NPOC has constituted crisis Management Committees (CMCs) at all levels specifically to take decisive action in emergency situations.

b. The CMCs are primarily concerned with the formulation of crisis element procedures, integration and orchestration of government, military/police public efforts towards the prevention and control of crisis incidents. All actions decisions taken by the CMC shall be within the policies laid down by the corresponding PCOs.
4-4  AFP-PNP Organization at National Level (FIG. 12A and 12B)

At the national level, the Chief, Philippine National Police represents the PNP the Chief of Staff shall represents the AFP at the Crisis Management Committee c-.!C). The Directors of the Aviation Security Command, Special Action Force, and the Maritime Command of the PNP and the Commanding Generals of the Major er.1ces of the AFP, shall organize, train, equip and maintain the following special mother units with capability for nationwide deployment in handling crisis situations:

a. PNP Aviation Security Command (PASCOM)
b. PNP Special Action Force (PNP SAF)
c. PNP Maritime Command (MARICOM)
d. PN Special Warfare Group (PN SWG)
e. PA Special Action Group from the PA Special Forces
f. PAF Special Operations Wing
FIG 12-A AFP Organization at National Level
FIG 12-B PNP Organization at National Level

Diagram showing the organizational structure of PNP at the national level, with CPNP at the top, followed by PASCOM, MARICOM, TMC, SAF, CIC, and CL, each having subordinates PCs & CPCs and DISTs, which in turn has STNS/ PRECINTS.
Section II. Lower Level Crisis Management Organizations (FIG. 13)
4-5 Lower Level Peace and Order Council (FIG. 14)

The Peace and Order Councils at the lower levels shall function in the same as and in accordance with the guidance of the NPOC at the following levels:

a. REGIONAL PEACE AND ORDER COUNCILS (RPOCs)
b. PROVINCIAL PEACE AND ORDER COUNCILS (PPOCs)
c. MUNICIPAL/CITY PEACE AND ORDER COUNCILS (M/CPOCs)

4-6 Lower Level Crisis Management Committee (CMC) (FIG. 14)

a. Lower Level Crisis Committee Management Organization

In accordance with Executive Order 320, as amended, Crisis Management committees are organized at all levels as follows:

(1) REGIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES (RCMCs)
(2) PROVINCIAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES (PCMCs)
(3) MUNICIPAL/CRISIS MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES (MCMCs)

b. Composition of the Lower Level CMCs

These lower level CMCs are composed of the political leadership, military police organizations, and the non-government organizations (NGOs) in the locality. CMC have four action groups which shall be placed under the operational of the On-Scene Commander. These groups are as follows:

(1) Negotiation Group
   (a) Negotiation Team
   (b) Liaison Team

(2) Operational Group
   (a) Security/Elements/Units
   (b) Police/Military Action Intervention Elements

3) Service Support Group
   (a) Military/Police Support Elements/Units
   (b) Government Agencies
   (c) Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)

(4) Public Affairs Group
   (a) Media Control and Liaison Team
   (b) Public Information Team
   (c) Civil Relations Team
c. Functions of the Lower Level CMCs (FIG. 14)

The CMCs shall exercise decision-making, coordination and prior at their respective levels in accordance with the guidelines of the higher CMCs.

4-7 AFP/PNP Organization at the Lower Levels

All AFP-PNP unit commanders at the regional, provincial, and municipal/city levels as shall organize an ad hoc CMO based on their respective crisis management forces/units. Such forces shall be composed of regular or special AFP-PNP organic to or under their operational control and situated in their respective operations.
FIG. 15. AFPIPNP ORGANIZATION AT LOWER LEVELS

REGIONAL LEVEL

PA DNs  PNP RECOMs  PAF CASEFs  PN DISTRICTS

PROVINCIAL LEVEL

PA BDE  PROVINCIAL COMMANDS  CASF ELEMENTS  PN ELEMENTS

CITY/MUNICIPAL LEVEL

PA BINs  PNP  PAF ELEMENTS  PN DISTRICTS

PNP  PNP  PNP
a. Philippine National Police

(1) **Regional** - The PNP Regional Command shall be the PNP Crisis Management Force for that region. The Regional Director shall be the police member in the Regional CMC. He shall designate his Deputy Regional Director for Operations as PNP Tactical Commander during crisis management operations at regional.

(2) **Provincial** - The PNP Local Command assigned to a province shall be the PNP Crisis Management Force for that province. The Provincial Director shall be the PNP tactical commander during crisis management operations in that province.

(3) **City/Municipal** - The PNP Chief of Police assigned to a city/municipality shall be the PNP Crisis Management Force for that city/municipality. Its commander shall be the PNP tactical commander during crisis management operations in city/municipality. In cities where there are PNP Mobile Force Companies, they shall be the PNP Crisis Management Forces and their commanders shall be the Tactical Commanders during crisis management operations in these cities.

(4) **PNP NSU** assigned in any of the foregoing levels or near thereto may be designated as PNP tactical action/intervention units in their Crisis Management Organization at the lower levels.

b. Philippine Army

(1) **Regional** - The PA Division assigned to a region shall be the PA Crisis Management Force for the region. The Division Commander shall be the PA tactical commander during crisis management operations.

(2) **Provincial** - The PA Brigade assigned to a province or nearest to province shall be the PA Crisis Management Force for that province. The Brigade Commander shall be the PA tactical commander during crisis management operations.

(3) **City/Municipal** - The PA Battalion, Company, platoon or detach assigned to a city/municipality or nearest to that city/municipality shall be the PA Crisis Management Force for that city/municipality. The PA Unit Commander shall be tactical commander during crisis management operations.

(4) **PA Special Units** - PA Special Units assigned in any of the foregoing levels or nearest thereto may be designated as PA tactical action/intervention units in their ad hoc Crisis Management Organization at the lower levels.

**Philippine Air Force**

(1) **Regional** - The PA Composite Air Support Force (CASF) assigned to a region shall be the PAF Crisis Management Force for that region. The CASF commander shall be the Tactical Commander during crisis management operations.
(2) Provincial, City/Municipal - The CASF Commander may assigned specific PAF Components or elements to a province or city/municipality to provide support to PA or PC/INP units engaged in crisis management operations in the seas.

(3) PAF Special Units - PAF Special Units assigned in any of the foregoing levels or nearest thereto may be designated as a PAF tactical action/intervention units the ad hoc Crisis Management Organization at the lower levels.

d. Philippine Navy

(1) Regional - The PNP District Command having the region as its area of operations (AOR) shall be the PN Crisis Management Force for that region. The District Commander shall be the PN Tactical Commander during crisis element operations in that region.

(2) Provincial, City/Municipality - The Naval District Commander amend may assigned specific PN Components or elements to a province or city/ municipality to provide naval support to PA or PC/INP units engaged in crisis element operations in these areas.

(3) PN Special Units - PN Special Units such as Philippine Coast Guard or Philippine Marines assigned in any of the foregoing levels or nearest thereto may be designated as a PN tactical action/intervention units in the ad hoc Crisis Management Organization at the lower levels.

Section III. CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

4-8. Organizational Level

a. National

(1) National Peace and Order Council (NPOC)

(2) NPOC Crisis Management Committee (CMC)

(a) Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
(b) Secretary, Department of National Defense (DND)
(c) Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development
(d) Secretary, Department of Justice (DOJ)
(e) Chairman, Cabinet Crisis Committee

(3) NHQ, PNP
(4) GHQ, AFP
b. Regional

(1) Regional Peace and Order Council (RPOC)

(2) Regional Crisis Management Committee (RCMC) same as at national level, the DOJ being represented by the Regional State Prosecution regional level.

(3) Regional Crisis Management Operations Centers (RCMOC) designated by the RCMC.

(4) AFP Units in the Region

   (a) PA Divisions
   (b) PAP Composite Air Support Forces (CASFs)
   (c) PN Districts

       Philippine Coast Guard
       Philippine Marine Brigades

   (d) Regional Non-Government Organizations

(5) PNP Units in the Region

c. Provincial

(1) Provincial Peace and Order Councils, (POCs)
(2) Provincial Crisis Management Committees (PCMC)
(3) Provincial Crisis Management Operation Centers (PCMOC)
(4) Provincial Government Agencies
(5) AFP Units in the Provinces

   (a) PA Brigades/Battalions
   (b) PAP Elements
   (c) PN Elements

(6) PNP Units in the Province
(7) Provincial Non-Government Agencies (PNGOs)

d. Municipal/City

(1) Municipal/City POCs

(2) Municipal /City CMCs - Same composition as that of the Provincial level, the DOJ being represented by the City / Municipal Court judge at the city/municipal level

(3) Municipal City CMOCs - to be designated by the CMC

(4) Municipal/City AFP Units
(a) PA Battalions/ Companies
(b) PAF Elements
(c) PN Elements
(5) Municipal /City PNP Units
(6) Municipal/City NGOs

(e) On-Scene Command Posts (OSCPs)

(f) Crisis Management Action Groups

(1) Negotiation Group
   (a) Negotiation
   (b) Liaison

(2) Operations Group
   (a) Security
   (b) Tactical/Action/Intervention
   (c) Utilities Liaison Team

(3) Service Support Group
   (a) Investigation/Legal
   (b) Intelligence
   (c) Communication-Electronics
   (d) Medical
   (e) Transportation
   (f) Logistics
   (g) Admin Support

(4) Public Affairs Group
   (a) Media Control/Liaison
   (b) Public Information
   (c) Civil Relations
4-8. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AD HOC ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
(FIG. 16)
4-9 National Level Crisis Management Organization

a. All crisis incidents at national level shall be handled by the NPOC Crisis Management Committee, headed by the Secretary of the Department of the Interior Government.

b. The NPOC CMC shall give the necessary orders to those concerned for the Ad Hoc National Crisis Management Organization.

c. The National Crisis Management Operations Center (NCMOC) shall be shed at IRC, NHQ Building, Camp Crame and the On-Scene Command Post be established at the most appropriate location in the vicinity of the crisis incident.

d. The participation of all AFP units in CMC-directed operations involving PNP shall be as directed by the Chief of Staff, AFP in coordination with Chief, PNP.

e. The NPOC CMC shall monitor crisis incident situations in the lower levels and be prepared to make decisions on matters referred by such lower level CMC.

4-10 Regional Level Crisis Management Organization

a. All crisis incidents at regional level shall be handled by the Regional Crisis element Committee.

b. The Regional CMC shall give the necessary orders to those concerned for the Ad Hoc Regional Crisis Management organization. Upon activation of, the Chairman of the Regional CMC shall immediately inform the Chairman, OC CMC.

c. The Regional Crisis Management Operation Center (RCMOC) shall be published at the PNP Regional Command Operations Center and the On-Scene and Post shall be established at the most appropriate location in the vicinity of the incident scene.

d. The participation of all AFP units shall be as directed by the PNP Regional in coordination with the Commanders of the AFP Major Service Components region. He shall likewise direct the participation of all PNP units in the crisis management operations.

e. The Regional CMC shall monitor crisis incident situations in the lower and be prepared to make decisions on matters referred by such lower level.

4-11 Provincial Level Crisis Management Organization

a. All crisis incidents at provincial level shall be handled by the Provincial City Management Committee.
b. The Provincial CMC shall give the necessary orders to those concerned the activation of the Ad Hoc Provincial Crisis Management Organizations. Chairman, Provincial CMC shall immediately inform the Chairman, Regional of its activation.

c. The Provincial Regional Crisis Management Operations Center shall be established at the PNP Provincial Command Operations Center and the Scene Command Post shall be established at the most appropriate location vicinity of the crisis incident scene.

d. The participation of all AFP units shall be as directed by the PNP Pro Director in coordination with the commanders of the AFP Major Service Compo in the province.

e. The Provincial CMC shall monitor crisis incident situations in the lower and be prepared to make decisions on matters referred by such lower level

4-12. City/Municipal Level Crisis Management Organization

a. All crisis incidents at city/municipal level shall be handled by the City/Municipal Crisis Management Committee.

b. The City/Municipal CMC shall give the necessary orders to those concerned for the activation of the Ad Hoc City/Municipal Crisis Management Organization

c. The Chairman, City/Municipal CMC shall immediately inform the regional CMC its activation.

d. The City/Municipal Crisis Management Operations Center (C/MCMOC) be established at the PNP Station Operations Center and the On-Scene Co Post shall be established at the most appropriate location in the vicinity of the incident scene.

e. The participation of all AFP units shall be as directed by the PNP provincial Director in coordination with the commanders of the AFP Major Service components in the city/municipality.

4-13 Crisis Management Operations Center (CMOC) (FIG. 17)

A Crisis Management Operations Center (CMOC) shall be established at the appropriate PNP Headquarters Operations Center where a crisis incident occurs. shall be the focal point of all communications coming from the On Command Post (OSCP) and a instructions from the CMC. The CMC members be at the CMOC while the crisis incident is in progress.
4-14. On-Scene Command Post (OSCP) (FIG. 18)

a. The On-Scene Command Post shall be established at the vicinity of the incident site where it can best monitor and control the crisis management opera: All instructions from the CMC shall be relayed to the OSCP through the C-IC

b. An On-Scene Commander (OSC) shall be designated by the Chairman, (from among the senior officers of the PNP Headquarters. He may be the Regional Director, RECOM Operations Officer, Provincial Director, Commander or Station Commander or any officer in the locality chosen depend upon the nature, gravity and possible implications of the incident. He shall be respond for everything happening to the crisis incident scene. He shall exercise direct and control over all negotiation, operations, support and public affair groups assigned to him by the CMC, regardless of the presence of any officer more senior than unless relieved by higher competent authority. All orders at the scene of the incident shall emanate from the On-Scene-Commander only. He shall and clear all his actions, if necessary, with the CMC.
Fig 18
a. Negotiation Group (FIG. 20) - This group shall be composed of selected officials/personalities and military/police personnel for the purpose of initiating with the terrorist elements and performing liaison functions between them.4 the On-Scene Command Post. This group shall be under the direct control and supervision of the On-Scene Commander.

(1) Negotiation Team - The Negotiating Team shall be headed by a chief negotiator properly selected by the Chairman, CMC from among trained negotiators. may include psychologist or an interpreter as required by the situation. The primary concern of the Negotiation Team is to save lives, prevent destruction of property, pave the way for a peaceful resolution of the crisis situation.

(2) Liaison Team - This team shall work in coordination with the Negotiation and the OSC and the Tactical Action Commander to ensure smooth coordination shall coordinates for all the required support of the Negotiation Team.

FIG. 20. Negotiation Group

b. Operations Group (FIG. 21) - This group shall be composed of regular and special military and police units/elements deployed in the crisis incident site to perform security functions and conduct tactical operations/interventions necessary and appropriate to neutralize the terrorist elements/perpetrators at the earliest possible time and at minimum risk and cost to life and property.
(1.) Security Units/Elements

These are military or police personnel who shall compose the area and perimeter security. Depending on the magnitude of the crisis, area security outside the immediate vicinity of the incident shall be established to prevent other forces friendly to the perpetrators from interfering or sending reinforcements either with men or materials.

(a) Area Security Units/Elements

AFP/Police units/elements tasked to provide general area security to contain evidence /criminal elements who may take advantage of the crisis incident

(b) Perimeter Security

AFP/Police units/elements tasked to provide outer and inner meter security in the immediate vicinity of the incident.

Outer Perimeter Security effort shall be directed outward and be distant enough from the scene to be out of the range of fire, prevent authorized TV coverage of the inner perimeter actions, prevent terrorist supporters observing action, and to perform crowd control functions to ensure that no one (terrorist reinforcements, press, curious spectators and other persons) who supposed to be at the scene of the incident.
Inner Perimeter Security shall be directed inward. They must questioned as close to the incident site as practicable, but out of the sight of. Their two main functions are containment and intelligence collection.

2) Tactical Action/ Intervention Units / Elements

These are AFP/Police units/elements and its specially organized, trained and to perform highly specialized anti-terrorist operations such as sniper persons, bomb detection and disposal and the like.

(3) Utilities Liaison Team - On orders of the OSC, coordinates with power, and water utility tries to regulate supply to the area where hostage taking for the purpose of enhancing government negotiation position.

c. Service Support Group (FIG. 22)

This group shall be composed of civilian agencies/organizations and military/police units tasked to provide the necessary administrative, operational and logistical support to the On-Scene Command Post. These support activities include feed distribution, medical evacuation, communication-electronics, transportation and be services. The Service Support shall have the following elements:

(1) Legal/Investigation Teams

These teams provides the necessary investigative support to the on-scene commander. They conduct the investigation, collation and preservation of evidence documentation and provide legal advice to the on-scene commander.

(2) Intelligence Team
This team is responsible for the collection and processing of all operations intelligence needed by the On-Scene Commander and his staff. The team must all intelligence gathered, and must be able to task other government elements for needed information. It maintains maps and diagrams showing current situation.

(3) Communications-Electronics Team

This team is responsible for insuring effective communications between the OSC and CMC, between the Reaction/Intervention Unit and the On-Scene Command Post (OSCP) between the Support Group Teams and the OSCP, and between the negotiations and the terrorist elements. It may also ensure that control is established over all other communications into and out of the crisis incident site.

(4) Logistics Team

This team is composed of support personnel who provide food and drinks ammunition, clothing, supplies, equipment, transportation, lighting electricity if needed and other logistical services. They also maintain facilities where off-duty persons can eat, rest and where briefings can be held. This team must be able to request needed items from appropriate agencies.

(5) Medical Team

The medical team provides medical supplies and services. It shall maintain contact with hospitals to ensure that they are prepared to handle any eventuality shall plan for the reception, treatment and evacuation of hostages and other casualties and after conclusion of the crisis incident.

(6) Fire-Fighting Team

It shall provide fire-fighting units to extinguish fires intentionally set by the perpetrators or fires resulting from the operation of the reaction/intervention.

RESTRICTED 77

(7) Administrative Support Team

These are personnel assigned to the OSCP to keep written record often incoming and outgoing communications and ensures continuity between shifts permits accurate Post incident Reports.

Public Affairs Group (FIG. 23)

This group shall be composed of civilian and military/police personnel tasked coordinate and control public information/media coverage, and community relations
(1) Public Information/Media Liaison and Control Team(s)

The team is stationed at the OSCP. The press relations or public affairs may release approved information to members of the print and broadcast media. The team may provide cleared briefings, and answer questions. The team may video coverage for documentation and training purposes when cleared by the DIC through the on-scene commander.

(2) Community Relations Team(s)

This team conducts civic action, provides public assistance, coordinates and supervises relocation of civilians displaced as a result of the terrorist action or of the military/police action taken against the terrorist elements and other activities necessary to ensure maximum public cooperation.

4-16. Inter-Agency Relationship at the lower levels

The lower level Crisis Management Committees shall be under the direct umbrella of the corresponding lower level Peace and Order Councils. These committees shall be guided by the policies set forth by such POCs.

All civilian government agencies, non-government agencies, military and police forces shall be placed under the control and supervision of the corresponding lower level CMC for the duration of the crisis incident. In cases of crisis incidents where immediate military/police action is needed...

The Chairman of the CMC any of the lower levels may coordinate directly with the designated military/police commander responsible in his locality for the employment of the necessary crisis action force/units.

For purpose of implementing this interim doctrine, all AFP/PNP units designated as crisis management operations forces/units shall be placed under the
operational control of the Chairman of the particular CMC having cognizance of a crisis incident, by the C, PNP, Chief of staff, AFP, or the Area Commander concerned. on orders of the Chairman, Crisis Management Committee.

In both of the foregoing instances, the AFP/PNP units designated to compose the crisis management force shall take orders directly from the designated military police tactical commander during the conduct of operations. These units shall revert to the control of their assigned Command upon termination of the crisis incident.
CHAPTER 5
HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION

Section I. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION PROCEDURES

5-1 Hostage-Taking Situation

a. The frequency with which the NPA, criminal elements, and even mentally enraged individuals resort to hostage-taking to achieve certain objectives, necessitate and military/police units as well as other civilian government agencies and non-government organizations organize and train hostage negotiation teams.

b. The procedures, tactics and techniques in hostage negotiation herein discussed b.: apply to a hostage-barricade incident, wherein the location of the hostage-taker ~ the hostage(s) are known and the incident site is surrounded and cordoned.

c. In the pursuit of the basic policy of "no concession to hostage-takers the riding goals of any negotiation are the preservation of life and the safe defense of hostages.

d. There are two basic concepts in a hostage-barricade situation, namely:

   (1) In a hostage-barricade situation, the hostage-takers have placed themselves willingly or unwillingly in direct confrontation with the authorities and therefore they must be prepared to deal with them. Since there is a confrontation, it safe to conclude that the hostage-takers are willing to discuss the situation.

   (2) It is not in the interest of the hostage-takers to get violent. They do not take hostages with the expressed purpose of taking their hostages' lives. They do it insider to coerce the authorities to behave in certain ways and eventually to exchange re hostages for something they want.

5-2 Categories of Hostages

The hostages could be simple civilians, government officials or military/personnel of various stages in life, position or rank.

5-3 Categories of Hostage-Takers

a. Criminals-

Criminals are generally more interested in money, escape or personal safety they may have taken hostage(s) in response to unforeseen circumstances and ha'e not really thought out the consequences of what they have done. Criminals may be operating alone and therefore unaffected by the opinions of others. If they are in a
group, they may begin to question the ability of their leader to make the right decision as events begin to turn unfavourable to them.

b. Mentally-deranged individuals take hostages because of something than may have provoked them. They probably have not engaged in planning whatsoever.

c. Terrorists, whether political or religious tend to be dedicated to their cause and are willing to risk their lives to ensure its success. They are generally part of all organization which has objectives and expectations which they feel obligated to meet. Since they operate in groups, they bolster each others' confidence and can relieve each other during long and extended negotiations. They are known to be using drugs to enhance their effectiveness and alertness for longer periods. Terrorists general create political complications and are more calculated and rational.

5-4 Personality Types of Hostage-Takers

The most common disorders involved in hostage-taking are the psychotic and personality disorders.

(1) Types of Psychotics

(a) Paranoid Schizophrenics

They are characterized by persistent false mental perceptions C~ beliefs such as delusions of persecution. Their thinking is often loose and makes sense. They can appear normal at some moments and psychotic at other times.

(b) Psychotic Depressives

They experience extreme sadness, hopelessness, feelings of ∼inadequacy, worthlessness, slow thinking and speech and indecisiveness. They have less concentration and are prone to suicide.

(2) Personality Disorders

(a) Anti-Social Personalities

They are repeatedly in conflict with society, thus, are incapable and are grossly selfish, callous and irresponsible. They feel no guilt and have frustration tolerance. They tend to blame others no matter what the circumstances they are probably the most difficult personality type to deal with.

(b) Inadequate Personalities

They are unable to respond effectively to emotional, social, intellectual and physical demands. They show ineptness, poor judgment, social stability and they lack physical and emotional stamina.
Quick Recognition Points

1. If a person's behaviour is weird, he is probably a paranoid schizophrenic.

2. If his response is something like "Go away and leave me alone", he is probably a psychotic depressive.

3. If the demands are fairly realistic, he may be an antisocial personality.

4. If he is totally unrealistic, the person is most likely an inadequate personality.

5-5 Tactics Against Hostage-Takers

A Establish and maintain communication

The first order of business is to establish contact with the hostage-takers trust may be initiated by the hostage-takers or by the authorities themselves. Once contact is established, endeavour to maintain communication with the hostage-takers and establish the following:

1. A problem-solving climate by showing a desire to understand and willingness to help.

2. A climate of compromise by adopting a give-and-take attitude and by showing a willingness to bargain and yield when necessary.

B Stall for time

1. The passage of time increases all basic human needs, both biological and psychological. These needs tend to multiply and become more complex as time passes by. Some of these are need for food, medicine, light, rest or release from tension. The negotiators are probably in a position to satisfy some of these needs and may even be able to create some that will alter need satisfying.

2. Another factor that is always present and related to time is stress. People tend to become more rational as they become less emotional. Therefore, to get your message across, first do something to reduce the hostage-takers' emotional level. The body reacts to stress through its adaptive mechanism. However, individuals can not maintain a high level of resistance to stress. Eventually, they will reach the exhaustion stage. The negotiators must be able to recognize this exhaustion stage and must be prepared not to reach this stage themselves by making arrangements for relief at appropriate times.

3. Except on certain exceptional cases, time is on the side of the negotiators. Always stall for time to achieve the following:

   a. Reduce the stress environment.
(b) Allow for negotiations external to the conflict zone.

(c) Permit the implementation of active hostage rescue efforts.

c. Obtain information

(1) The negotiator can use open-ended or close-ended questions depending on the initial reactions of the hostage-takers. Open-ended questions allow long answers while close-ended questions call for "yes or no" or brief responses. Usually negotiators must start with close-ended questions until rapport is established and the hostage-taker talks more spontaneously. Another technique is active listening which is practiced by restatement of content and reflection of feeling.

(2) In restatement of content, the negotiator must repeat in his own words what he thinks he has heard. This will show the hostage-taker that the negotiator has paid attention and that he understood what has been said at the same time giving the other persons opportunity to correct any error that the negotiator might have made.

(3) In reflection of feeling the negotiator must pay attention to what is said it was said. He must listen specifically for the strength, tone, and pace of the hostage-takers' voice to look for hidden messages. He must observe the feelings that the other person is experiencing. Again it shows the negotiator's interest and understanding and encourages the hostage-taker to talk.

d. Calm the hostage-takers using the following:

(1) Modelling

The negotiator must talk and respond in a calm and controlled manner have a very conversational tone. After a while, the hostage-takers will tend to follow manner of talking and begin to feel more calm.

(2) Ventilation

Give the hostage-takers time to talk without interrupting them.

(3) Distraction

Use this to draw the attention, of the hostage-takers away from whatever gathering them.

e. Establish Rapport - This can be done through the following:

(1) Show that you take the hostage-takers seriously and that you are sincere wailing towards a satisfactory agreement.

(2) Express empathy by showing that you understand their feelings and their can of view. Concentrate on what they say and do to find out their true motivation sympathize convincingly.
(3) Recognize the importance of helping the hostage-takers save face. Allow to retreat gracefully, control the pace of concession-giving and provide the hostage-takers with relevant, fact-saving rationalization should they concede in certain areas. When they are made to look weak and foolish before a significant audience, and are more likely to be adamant and may retaliate in some ways if their concession to loss of face.

(4) Do not express criticism, threats, or impatience since time is on your side and works in your favor.

(5) Be consistent and responsive in your behaviour in order to enhance cooperation.

(6) Try to empathize your similarity with the hostage-takers. They are more inclined to cooperate with those who have similar social background and experiences in life.

f. Use persuasion - Persuading consists essentially of the following:

(1) Agreement in part with their views. This decreases their resistance to later arguments.

(2) Deal with the small issues first thus creating an atmosphere of success. Put off the major problems until the hostage-takers have invested time and have shown greater interest in reaching an agreement.

(3) Break the big problem into smaller ones which are easier to handle.

(4) If no progress is being made, initiate issues to be negotiated and then give in on these in exchange for some concessions.

RESTRICTED 85

(5) In trying to convince, use episodic or historical information rather than statistical facts.

(6) Constantly suggest surrender. They might see this as a more viable alternative as things become more complicated.

(7) Maintain non-threatening communications, both verbal and non-verbal

(8) Agree with obvious reluctance to any demands that might be to your tactical advantage in exchange for concessions on the part of the hostage-takers. If the demands are to be advantage of the hostage-takers or fall in the area of non-negotiable items, stall for time and express willingness to seek alternative solutions.
g. Be alert on the development of the Stockholm Syndrome. The Stockholm Syndrome were the feelings developed by the hostages and the hostage-takers after being together in a bank in Stockholm for 131 hours.

(1) The three aspects of this syndrome are:

(a) Positive feeling of the hostages towards the hostage-takers.

(b) Negative feeling of the victims towards the authorities.

(c) Positive feeling of the hostage-takers towards the victims.

(2) While the negotiator has to live with the first two aspects, he must work hard encouraging the last aspect by:

(a) Emphasizing the hostages' human qualities.

(b) Asking to check on the health and condition of the hostages.

(c) Give the hostages and the hostage-takers things to do as a group for example, if they demand food, send in bulk items as un sliced meat, cheese or food which require cooperation, group activities and sharing.

Section II. HOSTAGE-NEGOTIATION CHECK-OFF LIST

5-6. WHAT? (SITUATION)

a. What has occurred?

b. Who initiated the call? From where? Who received it?

c. What was the time of occurrence?

d. What injuries were reported on:
   (1) Perpetrator/Suspect
   (2) Hostage
   (3) Other persons

e. Has contact been made with the perpetrator/suspect?
   (1) What kind?
   (2) When? By whom? How?

f. Is the situation locked in?,

g. What are negotiating positions:
   (1) What are the negotiable?
   (2) What are the non-negotiable?

5-7 WHERE?

a. Where are the perpetrators/suspects located?

b. Where are the hostages located?

c. Where are the non-hostages located?
d. What is the floor plan? As built plan?
   (1) Where are the ingresses and egresses?
   (2) Where are the telephones located?
   (3) Where are the observation points?
      (a) By the suspect of us?
      (b) By us of the suspects?

e. Where and what are the suspect's weapons?
   (1) Firearms
   (2) Explosives
   (3) Chemicals
   (4) Others

f. Where and what are the life support - basic human needs?
   (1) Needs
   (2) Desires

5-8   WHO?

a. Hostage-takers' 
   (1) Identities
   (2) Description - physical and clothing
   (3) Photo
   (4) I.D. Check
   (5) Psychological and medical profile
   (6) Other factors
   (7) Input from the family
   (8) Group affiliation

b. Hostage's 
   (1) Identity
   (2) Description
   (3) Photo
   (4) I.D. Check
   (5) Psychological and medical profile
   (6) Other factors
   (7) Input from the family, relatives and mends

c. Non-hostages' 
   (1) Identity
   (2) Description
   (3) Other factors

d. Other relevant personnel? (Suspects captures, hostages released, witnesses - they been interviewed?)
5-9 WHEN?

a. Deadlines?
b. Tuned mechanisms? (Vaults, alarms, lights, sound systems, locks?)

5-10 WHY?

a. Reasons?
b. Demands?
c. Ultimatums

5-11 HOW?

a. Negotiating Strategies

   (1) Contain and stabilize
   (2) Control over hostage-taking scene
   (3) Calm agitated perpetrators
   (4) Build rapport
   (5) No precipitous acts
   (6) Establish problem-solving climate
   (7) Establish climate of compromise
   (8) Avoid forcing climate
   (9) Avoid use of "soft bargainers" climate
   (10) Calming the perpetrator/suspect

      (a) Show understanding
      (b) Modelling
      (c) Encourage ventilation
      (d) Distraction
      (e) Non-verbal cues to aggression
      (f) Avoid provoking perpetrator/suspect

   -end-